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THE HUMAN COSTS OF THE IRAQ WAR  
AND U.S. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
 
 
by Carmen Draghici∗
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This contribution assesses the legitimacy of the Second Gulf War under 
international law through the lens of its human costs, exploring aspects such as the 
purported humanitarian nature of the intervention, the consistency of the warfare 
means and tactics employed with humanitarian law, and the compliance of U.S. military 
forces with the duties of occupying powers towards the civilian population after the 
termination of active hostilities. 
 
 
 
The widely saluted announcement of the upcoming withdrawal of U.S. forces 
from Iraq, released by the new U.S. administration in January 2009,1 prompts for 
reflection on the balance sheet of the Second Gulf War in terms of human costs and 
benefits. Thus, the purpose of this contribution is not to attempt an overall appraisal of 
the Iraq war from the viewpoint of international legality, but rather to delve into 
possible responsibility issues arising under international law from U.S. actions and 
decisions (dis)regarding the human costs of the war.2
 
 The analysis will focus on the 
human-costs factor in the decision of the U.S. administration to wage war, the choice of 
warfare means and tactics during the course of hostilities, and the conduct of the U.S. in 
its capacity as the occupying power. The aim is to determine which rules of 
international, humanitarian and/ or human rights law applied to each stage of the 
conflict, and whether the conduct of U.S. authorities was in breach of any relevant 
norm.  
                                                 ∗
 Lecturer in Law, The City Law School, City University London (UK). PhD in International 
Law and Human Rights, University of Rome “La Sapienza”. 
1
 See e.g. CNN article Obama to pull combat troops from Iraq by August 2010, 27 February 
2009 at http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/26/obama.troops/index.html. 
2
 While the analysis of wrongful acts in connection with the human costs of the Iraq war may be 
extended to the allied countries – indeed the UK has recently initiated its own “Iraq Inquiry” (see 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/) –, this contribution only explores the conduct of the U.S., as originator 
and main player in the conflict.  
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I. Jus ad Bellum Concerns: Was the Iraq Intervention ‘Humanitarian’? 
 
Scholarly literature offers little support to the doctrine of extra-legality of war, 
whose proponents assume that “law cannot say when, but only how, war is to be 
waged”.3 While the incidence of military interventions may render anarchic realism 
appealing, only exceptionally is the use of force permitted under modern international 
law. Indeed the prohibition on the use of force is widely recognized as a conspicuous 
example of peremptory norm,4 even though, as discussed below, the precise scope of 
this norm still leaves room for controversy. Thus, a first aspect to be considered when 
assessing responsibility in connection with the human costs of the intervention regards 
the jus ad bellum claims of the U.S. administration.5
Humanitarian intervention as an exception from the general prohibition on the 
use of force remains in itself highly divisive. It is true that the prohibition in Article 2 
paragraph 4 of the UN Charter can be said to be qualified rather than absolute, insofar 
as it does not ban the use of force tout court, but only the “use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. Nonetheless, the compatibility of 
humanitarian intervention with this provision requires a difficult demonstration. As 
emphasized by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case, “[b]etween 
independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of 
international relations”.
 From this perspective, the U.S. 
rhetoric attempting to legitimize the Iraq war as humanitarian intervention appears 
unpersuasive.  
6
 Admittedly, small-scale operations aimed at rescuing nationals 
abroad can be deemed compatible with the Charter, insofar as they do not impinge on 
the territorial integrity or political independence of the State concerned.7 However, 
forceful law-enforcement measures on the territory of another State are in contrast with 
the principle of equal sovereignty; they consequently run contrary to Article 2 paragraph 
4 in fine, a proviso designed to cover any use of force inconsistent with the purposes of 
the UN.8
                                                 
3
 See DINSTEIN, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 
2005 (4th ed.), pp. 73-75, for an overview of, and arguments against, this doctrinal position. 
 Their wrongfulness may be precluded, however, if the circumstances of the 
4
 See e.g. DINSTEIN, War…, cit., pp. 99-100, for references to evidence of general acceptance 
based on the work of the International Law Commission (hereinafter ILC) and the case-law of the 
International Court of Justice (hereinafter I.C.J.); see also GRAY, International Law and the Use of 
Force, Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2004 (2nd ed.), p. 29, for references to legal scholarship 
supporting this view. The ILC Commentaries on Art. 40 of the 2001 Draft articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, pp. 112-113, also provide an authoritative analysis of 
peremptory norms. 
5
 As the current contribution is concerned with the human costs of the intervention, it will only 
discuss the humanitarian rationale behind the U.S. decision to wage war; the other justifications – pre-
emptive self-defence in respect of State sponsorship of terrorism, and implied authorization by the UN 
Security Council – will not be addressed here. 
6
 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits), I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4, at p. 35.  
7
 On the arguments designed to justify the compatibility of forceful intervention to rescue 
nationals abroad with Art. 2 para. 4 of the Charter see RONZITTI, Rescuing nationals abroad through 
military coercion and intervention on grounds of humanity, Dordrecht (Martinus Nijhoff), 1985, pp. 1-19. 
8
 The wording “use of force [...] in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations” may be said to extend the ban to forceful measures undertaken in violation of the 
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case amount to a situation of distress within the meaning of Article 24 of the 2001 ILC 
Draft Articles on State responsibility,9 and thus the intervening State cannot reasonably 
be expected to seek consent before proceeding with the operation. In fact, the contexts 
in which the use of force has been relied on as an allegedly legitimate means to rescue 
nationals abroad – the Israeli rescue operation in Entebbe in 1976, the Egyptian raid on 
Larnaca in 1978, the U.S. attempt to free the U.S. hostages in Teheran by the incursion 
in Tabas in 1980, etc. – concerned particularly critical scenarios, possibly involving a 
situation of distress.10 Naturally, a circumstance precluding wrongfulness can only be 
invoked if it is accepted that minor uses of force (as opposed to military aggression) are 
not prohibited by a peremptory norm; in fact, breaches of a peremptory norm cannot be 
justified by reference to an exception under the law of responsibility.11 Also, if the 
measure taken in response to distress is not limited in scope (e.g. a mere extra-territorial 
police operation), it is “likely to create a comparable or greater peril”, and thus the 
exception based on distress is no longer available.12
Intervention on humanitarian grounds in favour of non-nationals is undoubtedly 
even more controversial. Unlike operations to rescue nationals abroad, based on an 
assumption that nationals are emanations or extensions of the State itself,
 
13
 intervention 
for the benefit of non-nationals cannot be corroborated by self-defence justifications. 
Also, as Ronzitti points out, unlike rescuing operations on foreign territory, 
“humanitarian intervention has no unquestionable ‘historic titles’ supporting its 
legality”.14 There are no significant precedents confirming that States considered 
themselves entitled to intervene unilaterally in case of widespread atrocities. Farer 
maintains that “there is not a single case in the entire post-war era where one state has 
intervened in another for the exclusive purpose of halting mass murder, much less any 
other gross violation of human rights”.15
                                                                                                                                               
principle of equal sovereignty enshrined in Art. 2 para. 1 of the UN Charter: “The Organization is based 
on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”. Sovereign equality is not listed under the 
Purposes in Art. 1, but is engaged by the opening sentence of Art. 2: “The Organization and its Members, 
in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles”. The 
broad wording of Article 2 para. 4 of the UN Charter suggests that it needs to be construed purposively. 
 In fact, the Cold War individual interventions 
9
 See Art. 24 para. 1 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility: “The wrongfulness of an 
act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that State is precluded if the author of 
the act in question has no other reasonable way, in a situation of distress, of saving the author’s life or the 
lives of other persons entrusted to the author’s care”. 
10
 On the incidents arising under the putative right to protect citizens abroad see RONZITTI, 
Rescuing nationals abroad, cit., pp. 26-49. See also SCHACHTER, The Right of States to Use Armed 
Force, in Michigan Law Review, vol. 82, 1983/1984, pp. 1620-1646. 
11
 See Art. 26 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
12
 See Art. 24 para. 2 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility: “Paragraph 1 does not 
apply if: [...] (b) The act in question is likely to create a comparable or greater peril”. 
13
 See RONZITTI, loc. cit. 
14
 Ibid., p.108. 
15
 See FARER, An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, in FISLER 
DAMROSCH – SCHEFFER (Eds.), Law and Force in the New International Order, Boulder (Colorado), 
Oxford (Westview Press), 1991, pp. 185-201, at pp. 192-193. Farer cites the Indonesian campaign to 
suppress opposition in East Timor, and the massacre of Hutu people in Burundi, as examples of 
slaughters which may have given rise to intervention based on the above-mentioned doctrine, but in 
practice did not; he also refers to the widespread torturous practices used in the criminal judicial systems 
of Turkey and Mexico, which did not result in any claim to a right to intervention. 
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on putative humanitarian grounds – Indian intervention in Bangladesh in 1971 to help 
the people secure independence from Pakistan and to end repression; Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia in 1978 leading to the overthrow of Pol Pot; Tanzanian 
intervention in Uganda in 1979 resulting in the overthrowing of Idi Amin; U.S. 
intervention in Panama in 1989 – were also supported by additional justifications, such 
as self-defence claims.16 This suggests that the intervening states were not confident to 
rely on a right to humanitarian intervention. Krisch persuasively argues: “[f]or a right to 
unilateral humanitarian intervention to emerge, […] its positive assertion by the actors 
as well as its acceptance by other states would be necessary. This has not yet occurred 
[...]”.17
Significantly, in his Dissenting Opinion in the Nicaragua Case, Judge Schwebel 
emphasized: “In contemporary international law, the right of self-determination, 
freedom and independence of peoples is universally recognized; the right of peoples to 
struggle to achieve these ends is universally accepted; but what is not universally 
recognized and what is not universally accepted is any right of such peoples to foreign 
assistance or support which constitutes intervention. That is to say, [...] it is not lawful 
for a foreign State or movement to intervene in that struggle with force or to provide 
arms […]”.
  
18
 The case was primarily concerned with military assistance to subversion; 
the reasoning should apply a fortiori to military intervention amounting to a full-fledged 
war, as the one in Iraq. Further, if intervention is not admissible even in the presence of 
the ultimate form of oppression, which is a colonial regime denying a people’s right to 
self-determination, protected by a peremptory norm,19 there can be no lawful 
intervention to depose a foreign government violating human rights.20
When purely internal humanitarian crises do require intervention, world public 
order can only be ensured with UN authorization, as nothing in the language of the 
Charter justifies unilateral coercive measures as actio popularis. As Dinstein argues 
suggestively, “[n]o individual State (or group of States) is authorized to act unilaterally, 
in the domain of human rights or in any other sphere, as if it were the policeman of the 
world”.
 
21
                                                 
16
 See RONZITTI, cit., pp. 95-106, 108-109; Farer, cit., p. 194; KRISH, Legality, Morality and 
the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo, in EJIL, 2002, vol. 13(1), pp. 323-335, at pp. 
325-326; GRAY, cit., pp. 31-32; WEISS, Military-Civilian Interactions. Humanitarian Crises and the 
Responsibility to Protect, Lanham etc. (Rowman & Littlefield), 2005 (2nd ed.), pp. 181-187. 
 In fact, nowhere in the Charter is there any implied right to individual 
17
 KRISCH, cit., p. 326. 
18
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America). (Merits), I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, Dissenting Opinion, p. 351 (para. 180) (emphasis in 
original).  
19
 See East Timor (Portugal v Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90, at p. 102 (para. 
29); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, 
pp. 31-32 (paras. 52-53); Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1975, pp. 31-33 (paras. 54-
59). 
20
 Indeed there is scholarly support for the thesis that armed intervention by a State is not 
permitted under international law even when aimed at overthrowing a genocidal regime. See DINSTEIN, 
War…, cit., p. 90: “notwithstanding fervent pleadings to the contrary, should Atlantica use force 
unilaterally in order to overthrow a despotic (even genocidal) regime in Patagonia, it would also run afoul 
of Article 2(4)”. 
21
 DINSTEIN, War…, cit., pp. 90-91. 
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humanitarian intervention analogous to the individual (as opposed to collective) self-
defence in Article 51. Quite on the contrary, Article 1 paragraph 3 of the UN Charter 
sets out to “achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of […] 
humanitarian character”. Article 5 (1) of the General Assembly resolution on the 
Definition of Aggression, providing that “No consideration of whatever nature, whether 
political, economic, military, or otherwise, may serve as a justification for 
aggression”,22 also advocates against humanitarian intervention by individual States.23 
To be lawful, any such intervention must take place within the framework of the 
collective security system, insofar as only the Security Council “is legally competent to 
undertake or to authorize forcible ‘humanitarian intervention’”.24
It is worth recalling that individual humanitarian intervention also clashes with 
the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other States, especially if 
undertaken in response to situations of chronic human rights violations, as opposed to 
humanitarian emergencies. The General Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations 
categorically excludes any right of States to intervene “directly or indirectly”, a fortiori 
militarily, “for any reason whatsoever”.
 
25
In more recent years, the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention has been 
reconsidered by reference to the so-called “responsibility to protect”.  The International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), submitted in its 2001 
report
 It is therefore difficult to argue that the 
principle of non-intervention should allow for exceptions, and that, in extreme cases, 
coercion should be admitted in order to induce a State to put an end to abuses against its 
own citizens (e.g. genocide or widespread torture). Also, the practice of States in respect 
of humanitarian emergencies, referred to above, does not support any such proposition.  
26
                                                 
22
 General Assembly Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, Res. 3314 (XXIX), 14 
December 1974. 
 (arguably de lege ferenda): “There is an international responsibility to protect 
populations at risk, and this Commission has argued that it extends to a responsibility to 
react by appropriate means if catastrophe is occurring, or seems imminent. In extreme 
cases, that responsibility to react includes military intervention within a state, to carry 
out that human protection”. The suggestion is that the responsibility to protect may 
23
 See GRAY, cit., p. 33. Ronzitti also suggests that the declarations issued by States at the time 
of the drafting of the Resolution on the Definition of Aggression confirmed the intention to deny an 
exception from the prohibition on the use of force based on humanitarian intervention. See RONZITTI, 
cit, p. 110. 
24
 DINSTEIN, War…, cit., p. 91. 
25
 See Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States, General Assembly Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970: “No State or group of 
States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external 
affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or 
attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural 
elements, are in violation of international law”.   
26
 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), an independent 
international body intended to support the work of the UN, had the mandate to study how to reconcile the 
international community’s responsibility to act in the face of massive violations of norms of humanity 
with the principle of respect for the sovereign rights of States. The ICISS completed its work during the 
2000/01 Millennium Assembly year, and reported back to the UN Secretary-General and Member States 
in December 2001. The ICISS report The Responsibility to Protect is available at 
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf. See also BELLAMY, Responsibility to Protect. The 
Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, Cambridge (Polity), 2009, p. 51. 
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provide for an exception from the principle of non-intervention; however, humanitarian 
intervention, the most extreme form of reaction, can only be admitted in case of mass 
atrocities perpetrated by a State against its nationals, where there is imminent peril of 
humanitarian catastrophe. In preparation of the September 2005 UN Summit aimed at 
reviewing progress since the Millennium Declaration, Secretary General Kofi Annan’s 
report In Larger Freedom on the implementation of the Millennium Goals also urged 
heads of State and government to “[e]mbrace the ‘responsibility to protect’ as a basis for 
collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”.27
The 2005 World Summit Outcome document stated accordingly: “[W]e are 
prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case 
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity”.
  
28
 The cautious wording of the document confirms that the international 
opinio iuris confines humanitarian intervention (even when UN-authorized, let alone 
otherwise) to rather extreme circumstances. Most importantly, the responsibility to 
protect is connected with collective action through the Security Council. It has been 
argued that, as a result of the humanitarian interventions following the end of the Cold 
War (Kuwait, Somalia, Rwanda, Balkans, East Timor), the “sanctity of sovereignty has 
been downgraded”.29 This is not to say that abuse is warranted by entrusting public 
interests to the discretion of individual States. Collective humanitarian intervention, 
based on the prerogatives of the Security Council under the UN Charter,30
Thus, the Iraq intervention does not meet the two threshold criteria governing 
when and who may intervene: imminent humanitarian catastrophe and just authority. By 
contrast with Kosovo or the humanitarian emergencies considered by the Security 
Council to require collective action (Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, etc.), the Iraq war was not 
a reaction to a situation of gross violations of human rights underway leading to 
imminent catastrophe. It is unquestionable that the Ba’ath regime led by Saddam 
Hussein perpetrated large-scale violations of human rights, in fact torture, prolonged 
 cannot 
provide legal support for unilateral intervention under general international law. The 
ICISS also circumscribes the exercise of humanitarian intervention, subordinating the 
“responsibility to protect” to the principle of “just authority”. Just authority for military 
intervention on humanitarian grounds may be provided by the support of the Security 
Council, in the form of delegated powers pursuant to Article 42, taken in conjunction 
with Article 43 (and Article 48) as modified by way of practice.  
                                                 
27
 In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the 
Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, UN Doc. A/59/2005, p. 59 (para. 7 (b)). 
28
 2005 World Summit Outcome document adopted by the General Assembly on 15 September 
2005, Doc. A/60/L.1, para. 139. 
29
 WHITE, The Ethics of Invasion: Jus ad Bellum and Iraq, in COADY– O’KEEFE (Eds.), 
Righteous Violence: The Ethics and Politics of Military Intervention, Melbourne (Melbourne University 
Press), pp. 32-50, at p. 33. 
30
 See CADIN, I presupposti dell’azione del Consiglio di Sicurezza nell’articolo 39 della Carta 
delle Nazioni Unite, Milano (Giuffrè), 2008, pp. 101–176, on Art. 39 determinations and gross human 
rights violations. 
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detention without trial, forced disappearances, and genocidal acts against the Kurdish 
minority are well-documented.31 However, the enduring situation of human rights 
abuses in Iraq was unlikely to fall under the scope of an emergency. As White argues, 
the threat to Iraqi citizens under Saddam’s regime was serious, but also long-
established, while the doctrine of humanitarian intervention “had been conceived from 
the need to provide for a response to sudden emergencies like Rwanda, East Timor and 
Kosovo”.32
As to the second threshold condition identified, it cannot be overstressed that 
support for humanitarian intervention was consistently expressed in the context of 
collective action to be undertaken by the international community, and certainly not as a 
tool placed at the discretion of individual States.  Conversely, the invasion by the 
coalition forces in March 2003 had no support from the Security Council.
 Intervention should be limited to pressing circumstances leaving no time for 
seeking and implementing alternative solutions (diplomatic action, non-military 
coercive measures). It is submitted here that the Caroline standard governing self-
defence should all the more be applicable to humanitarian intervention, as no direct and 
vital interest of the intervening State is endangered. Given the imperative nature of the 
prohibition on the use of force, and the fundamental importance of the principle of 
sovereignty in international law, humanitarian intervention should indeed be narrowly 
construed. A pattern of long-established oppressive regime clearly does not comply with 
such stringent criteria. 
33
 
Alternatively, at least support from a regional organization would be required, as proof 
of sufficient agreement within the international community, and guarantee against the 
pursuit of private interests. NATO’s operation in Kosovo in 1999 arguably reopened the 
debate on the acceptability of regional intervention in extreme cases, when the Security 
Council is paralysed by the veto of a permanent member.34 Albeit not authorized by the 
Security Council as required by Article 53 of the Charter, NATO intervention 
constituted multilateral action carried out by a large regional organization, which 
conferred a minimum degree of legitimacy. By contrast, in the case of Iraq there was 
significant disagreement within NATO and the EU on the matter.35
                                                 
31
 See eg. Human Rights Watch, World Report (2000); Amnesty International, Annual Report 
(2001); Report of the UN special rapporteur on Iraq, Andreas Mavrommatis, E/CN.4/2001/42, 16 January 
2001. 
 Thus, despite the 
participation of other States, the 2003 U.S. decision to wage war remained essentially 
unilateral, and departed from any model of international policing under UN auspices. As 
such, the intervention posed a threat to the international order, denying the sovereign 
equality of States, marginalizing the UN collective security system, and promoting the 
do-it-yourself resolution of international crises. 
32
 WHITE, cit., p. 42 (emphasis added). 
33
 See TOMUSCHAT, R (on the Application of Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence. 
Human rights in a multi-level system of governance and the internment of suspected terrorists, in 
Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2008, vol. 15, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbJIL/2008/15.html. 
34
 See GAZZINI, The Rules on the Use of Force at the Beginning of the XXI Century, in Journal 
of Conflict & Security Law, 2006, 11(3), pp. 319-342, at pp. 324-328. 
35
 See WEISS, cit., p. 179. 
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The claim to legitimacy of the Iraq intervention was further discredited by its ill-
founded doctrinal basis. In fact, the reading of official U.S. statements conveys a 
posture akin to ideological rather than humanitarian intervention. The 2002 State of the 
Union Address identified Iraq as part of the axis of evil,36 and, as a result, the U.S. 
administration overtly pursued a policy of régime change. Significantly, the operation 
that drove Saddam Hussein from power in April 2003 was called Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. In his Address to the Nation on Iraq of 17 March 2003, President Bush 
notably sent a message to Iraqi citizens: “We will tear down the apparatus of terror and 
we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free. [...] The tyrant will 
soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near”.37 The declarations of President Bush 
upon the capture of Saddam Hussein are also eloquent: “This afternoon I have a 
message for the Iraqi people. You will not have to fear the rule of Saddam Hussein ever 
again”; “The capture of this man was crucial to the rise of a free Iraq”.38 Thus, the Bush 
administration justified the use of force against the oppressive regime of Saddam 
Hussein as aimed at forging a better régime for the people rather than ending an 
imminent catastrophe.39
Proponents of democratic intervention attempt to found the legality of the use of 
force on the purpose of furthering UN goals such as human rights.
  
40
 Such a discourse 
may appear attractive, but intervention allegedly aiming at freeing a people from a 
tyrant appears unwarranted under international law. In this regard, the ICJ emphasized 
in the Nicaragua Case that “[h]owever the régime in Nicaragua be defined, adherence 
by a State to any particular doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary 
international law; to hold otherwise would make nonsense of the fundamental principle 
of State sovereignty, on which the whole of international law rests, and the freedom of 
choice of the political, social, economic and cultural system of a State”.41 It may be 
true, as Franck argues, that current international law has established a “democratic 
entitlement” for the citizens of the member States of the international community.42
                                                 
36
 See the State of the Union address of President Bush of January 29, 2002, available at 
 
However, the coercive implementation of the democratic entitlement remains, at best, a 
matter for the international community collectively, especially as far as any forcible 
measures are concerned (as opposed to political pressure, public condemnation, or 
economic sanctions). The use of force by a State against the oppressive regime in 
another State (‘the lesser of two evils’) is at variance with many founding principles of 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-11.html. 
37
 President Bush’s Address to the Nation on Iraq of 17 March 2003, available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/17/sprj.irq.bush.transcript/. 
38
 See the New York Times report at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/15/world/capture-
hussein-president-bush-s-cautious-demeanor-masks-white-house-elation.html. 
39
 See also MURPHY, cit., p. 173: “attention was called to the welfare of the Iraqi people and the 
need to help them throw off a despotic and abusive ruler”. 
40
 See GRAY, cit., p. 50. 
41
 Nicaragua Case, cit., p. 133 (para. 263). 
42
 See FRANCK, Intervention against Illegitimate Regimes, in FISLER DAMROSH – 
SCHEFFER (Eds.), Law and Force ..., cit., pp. 159-176, at p. 166. The author refers to the right of every 
citizen “to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives”, as 
guaranteed by Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which he considers 
to have entered the process of becoming customary law. 
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international law in the post - UN Charter era. Even though it does not affect the 
territorial integrity of the State concerned, as per Article 2 (4) of the Charter, military 
intervention seeking to overthrow a regime on behalf of its victims does affect the 
political independence of that State, and contravenes the principles of sovereign equality 
and self-determination of peoples. Any individual attempt at mounting an expedition in 
the name of a controversial right to democracy would therefore remain at odds with the 
prohibition of the use of force in international relations. A right to ideological 
intervention not connected with a humanitarian emergency would also be an undesirable 
development, as it would readily provide pretexts for abuse.43 The interventions of 
States during the Security Council meetings on the Iraqi situation in March 2003 show 
that there has been no evolution in the opinion juris in this respect. Numerous countries 
in fact emphasized the illegality of the régime change policy pursued by the U.S.44
Pro-democratic intervention must be kept distinct from the forcible intervention 
to restore democracy authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII in the 
presence of additional circumstances constituting a threat to international peace and 
security (see the case of Haiti). As Gray emphasizes, that authorization was exceptional, 
and in fact the overthrow of democratic rule in most instances – Burma (1990), Algeria 
(1991), Nigeria (1993), Niger (1996), Pakistan (1999), Cote d’Ivoire (1999), Fiji (2000), 
Central African Republic (2003) – did not give rise to any authorization to use force or 
even sanctions.
  
45
The application of the rules on international responsibility further supports this 
conclusion.  It can certainly be accepted that gross violations of human rights are a 
matter of concern for the whole international community, and that the perpetrating 
government violates obligations protecting collective interests, i.e. erga omnes 
obligations. However, if that is the case, the other members of the international 
community can only respond with lawful measures in order to induce that State to put 
an end to the breaches;
 
46
 peaceful countermeasures are not permitted, let alone 
countermeasures involving military action (hence, the violation of a peremptory 
norm).47
Whether there were any genuine humanitarian considerations behind it or not, 
the scale of the Iraq intervention, amounting to complete occupation and obliteration of 
the system of government, was clearly disproportionate with respect to the crisis 
prompting the intervention.
  
48
                                                 
43
 Frank underlines that the application of the principle of self-determination has proven 
susceptible of turning into a “license of self-promoting states to mount fishing expeditions for their own 
advantage” (op. cit, p. 166). The affirmation of a principle of democratic intervention would entail similar 
application problems. 
 Even if it had been a warranted exercise of self-defence, 
44
 See Security Council meetings of 19, 26 and 27 March 2003, Press releases SC/7696, 
SC/7705, SC/7707. 
45
 See GRAY, cit., pp. 51-52. 
46
 See Art. 48 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
47
 Article 50 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility specifically prohibits the use of 
force as a countermeasure, even by the injured State (if there is any): “ 1. Countermeasures shall not 
affect: (a) the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations;[…]”. 
48
 See WHITE, cit., p. 43: “If Saddam’s regime had been engaged in systematic mass murder of 
a large proportion of its population, as the Khmer Rouge did in Cambodia in the 1970’s, this kind of 
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based on more than misrepresentations of the weapons of mass destruction threat, still 
the legality of the Iraq invasion would have remained problematic. In fact, it is doubtful 
that régime change can ever be considered consistent with international law: insofar as 
even lawful forceful measures are subject to the principle of proportionality, they can 
never be equated with a licence for régime change. Quite on the contrary, as a matter of 
principle, under international law any armed intervention, regardless of its motivation, 
should, to the extent possible, allow the preservation of the political organization in 
place before invasion.49 Since humanitarian intervention may be admissible only as last 
resort, to put an end to a catastrophe or to prevent a humanitarian disaster, it should be 
confined to this very limited purpose.50
Moreover, the humanitarian jus ad bellum claims of the Bush administration 
seem to have been at odds with the principle of good faith. The Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty on the responsibility to 
protect also includes a test of “right intention”, i.e. whether the motives are indeed 
humanitarian.
  
51
 The allegation that the invasion sought to protect the human rights of 
the Iraqi population was introduced by U.S. officials as a parallel, subsequent, and 
secondary motivation. The war was initially justified as an exercise of the right to pre-
emptive self-defence proclaimed by the Bush doctrine (as notoriously articulated in the 
National Security Strategy 2002), in the face of Iraq’s (undocumented) possession of 
weapons of mass destruction, coupled with alleged connections with Al-Qaeda, hence 
the risk that such weapons could be made available to terrorists. The first legal basis 
officially invoked by the U.S., when notifying the intervention to the Security Council 
on the day the hostilities commenced, was in fact Article 51 of the UN Charter. The 
U.S. additionally relied on an implicitly authorized enforcement of previous Security 
Council resolutions.52
                                                                                                                                               
action might have been proportionate to the emergency, and therefore legitimate. But appalling as 
Saddam’s regime undoubtedly was, he did not pose an immediate threat to Iraq’s people on that scale”. 
 The humanitarian claims were rather adduced as a means to 
rationalize the recourse to war “only after the original rationale of the attack was 
substantially undermined by the failure to locate the alleged weapons of mass 
49
 Art. 43 of the Hague Regulations, discussed in further detail infra, requires occupying powers 
to preserve to the extent possible the law of the occupied territory, which should include to the very least 
the main institutional setting. 
50
 A use of force going well beyond this objective is bound to be unlawful. As the UK 
representatives argued in defence of NATO operations, humanitarian intervention is understood as an 
exceptional use of force “directed exclusively to averting a humanitarian catastrophe, and […] the 
minimum necessary for that purpose”. See Security Council meeting of 24 March 1999, Press release 
SC/6657.  
51
 See ICISS, Responsibility to Protect, cit. note 22, pp. 35-36. See also the principle as 
articulated in the Synopsis on p. XII: “Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever 
other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is 
better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims 
concerned”. 
52
 The U.S. sought implied authorization in Resolutions 678 (1990) and 687 (1991), and 
considered that Iraq had decided not to avail itself of its final opportunity under Resolution 1441 (2002); 
given Iraq’s breaches, the U.S. representative argued, the basis for the ceasefire in Resolution 687 (1991) 
had been removed, and the use of force was authorized under Resolution 678 (1990).  On the 
controversial reliance on an implied Security Council authorization to secure the disarmament of Iraq see 
GRAY, cit., pp. 270-281; LOWE, cit., pp. 865-866. 
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destruction”.53 The hesitation between different, and arguably far-fetched, motivations 
suggests that the humanitarian contention was spurious.54
Finally, in order to qualify as humanitarian, an intervention may not cause 
greater damage than the one it purports to avoid or to bring to an end. The classical jus 
ad bellum doctrine encompasses a “utilitarian” dimension; it predicates that “resort to 
armed force can only be justified in order to prevent worse outcomes”.
  
55
 Similarly, the 
criteria defined by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
for lawful military intervention in defence of foreign civilian populations encompass 
“reasonable prospects”. The ICISS suggested, amongst the tests for righteous 
humanitarian intervention, the “balance of consequences”, i.e. whether military 
intervention would do more harm than good.56
From this viewpoint there was significant inconsistency between the declared 
humanitarian purpose of the intervention and the choice of means, i.e. full-scale war. As 
has been noted, “defenders of a right to intervene on humanitarian grounds have 
consistently laid claim to a higher morality than their opponents. Yet the history of 
humanitarian interventions is one of abuse, and the loss of blood incurred in its course 
draws into doubt this moral high ground.”
  
57
 Iraq post-invasion is probably worse off, as 
the intervention predictably unleashed sectarian violence of a non-conventional type. 
Amnesty International stressed that “US and UK authorities were repeatedly warned 
before the conflict by Amnesty International and others that there was a grave risk of 
widespread disorder, humanitarian crisis and human rights abuses, including revenge 
attacks, once the Iraqi government’s authority was removed”.58 Thus, several years after 
the “liberating” intervention, the country is characterized by political instability, lack of 
security and greater loss of human lives than under Saddam.59
Also, as discussed below, the operations were not planned in such a way as to 
ensure that, for the civilian population, the advantages obtained outweighed the losses 
(in terms of effective enjoyment of the right to life, integrity, security, family life, 
education etc.). It can be submitted, accordingly, that the U.S. did not exercise due 
diligence when calculating the costs and benefits of the war.
  
60
                                                 
53
 SULYOK, Is Intervention Humanitarian? Protecting Human Rights and Democracy Abroad, 
in EJIL, 2004, vol. 15 (5), pp. 1058-1063, at p. 1061. 
 Together with the lack of 
54
 See KRITSIOTIS, Arguments of Mass Confusion, in EJIL, 2004, vol. 15(2), pp. 233-278, at p. 
234: “From President Bush’s commitment to expanding the boundaries of pre-emptive self-defence in a 
terror-struck world to the utilization of an intriguing complement of Security Council resolutions 
stretching as far back as 1990, we became perplexed spectators to the sport of nurturing different 
arguments as possible candidates for the legal justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom”. 
55
 WHITE, cit., p. 34. 
56
 See ICISS, cit., pp. 32 ff. 
57
 KRISCH, cit., p. 324. 
58
 See Amnesty International, Iraq. Looting, Lawlessness and Humanitarian Consequences 
(2003), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/085/2003/en/a4389c50-d703-11dd-
b0cc-1f0860013475/mde140852003en.pdf, p. 1. 
59
 See, e.g., the disquieting revelations of the 2006 survey conducted by an American and Iraqi 
team of public health researchers, The Human Cost of the War in Iraq. A Mortality Study, 2002-2006, 
available at http://web.mit.edu/cis/human-cost-war-101106.pdf, which assessed deaths occurring during 
the period from January 1, 2002, through the time of survey in 2006: “Death rates were 5.5/1,000/year 
pre-invasion, and overall, 13.2/1,000/year for the 40 months post-invasion” (at p. 1). 
60
 See WHITE, cit., pp. 35-36. 
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credibility of the motivation for waging the war, the disregard of the foreseeable adverse 
impact on the population suggests that the intervention was hardly humanitarian in any 
meaningful way.  
 
 
II. Jus in Bello Requirements: Was the Unlawful Intervention Lawfully 
Waged? 
 
The law of international armed conflict is “predicated on a subtle equilibrium 
between two diametrically opposed impulses: military necessity and humanitarian 
considerations”.61 This proposition stands true irrespective of the causes, nature and 
purposes of the war; however, when the justification for the war was, at least in part, 
based on humanitarian grounds, an emphasis on military necessity at the expense of 
humanitarian considerations appears particularly critical. It may be useful to recall that, 
in the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ considered whether the goal of protecting human rights 
may provide a legal justification for the use of force, and concluded that a humanitarian 
objective is not compatible with undertakings such as the mining of ports, or the 
destruction of oil installations.62 Also, in respect of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, 
commentators argued that a bombing campaign cannot be considered a humanitarian 
action, as only a ground operation could have secured the minimum loss of incidental 
civilian life.63
That said, international responsibility will arise in any event, regardless of the 
motivation relied on for the military operations, where the choice of warfare means 
results in grave casualties, and excesses unwarranted by actual war necessities occur. In 
effect, one of the core concepts of the laws of armed conflict, as enshrined in Article 22 
of the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907,
 The same compelling ethical-legal considerations affect the Iraq 
campaign. It is submitted that military operations cannot constitute humanitarian 
intervention where the means used to constrain an oppressive and torturous regime to 
comply with human rights cause great damage to the civil population, and to the 
infrastructure on which they depend for their survival and welfare.  
64
                                                 
61
 DINSTEIN, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 
Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2004, p. 16. See also GREEN, The Contemporary Law of 
Armed Conflict, Manchester (Manchester University Press), 2000 (2nd edition), p. 126: “Necessity 
concerns those activities, subject to any restrictions imposed by the law, such as the ban on the killing of 
prisoners, which are essential to achieve victory. The principle of humanity regulates the degree of 
permitted violence, forbidding action which is unnecessary or excessive for the achievement of victory, 
particularly with regard to the treatment of non-combatants. The principles of necessity and humanity are 
complementary, seeking to adjust the means essential to realise the purpose of the conflict with the 
minimisation of human suffering and physical destruction”. 
 and in Article 35 paragraph 1 of the 1977 
62
 Nicaragua (Merits), cit., para. 268. 
63
 See GRAY, cit., p. 42, note 50. 
64
 See Article 22 of Hague Convention IV respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 
18 October 1907 (identical to Article 22 of Hague Convention II of 29 July 1899): “The right of 
belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited”. The 1907 Hague Convention IV 
entered into force on 26 January 26 1910. 
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Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions,65
More specifically, the laws of war prohibit inter alia weapons that cause 
superfluous injury and suffering. This principle, first enshrined in the Preamble of the 
1868 St Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive 
Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weight,
 is that the right of belligerents to 
choose means and methods of warfare is not unlimited.  
66
 was reaffirmed in Article 23 of the 1899 
Hague Convention II.67 The bar on the infliction of unnecessary suffering to combatants 
finds support in various sectoral international treaties banning specific types of 
weapons.68 Additionally, the Martens clause, incorporated in the Preamble of the 1899 
Hague Convention II and 1907 Hague Convention IV, as well as in Article 1 (2) of 
Additional Protocol I, establishes that, absent specific international agreements, 
combatants are entitled to protection by virtue of “principles of humanity” and “dictates 
of public conscience”.69 The U.S. is a party to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, and 
though it is not a party to Additional Protocol I, many provisions of the latter – Part III 
and several chapters of Part IV (in particular Articles 35-60) dealing with the conduct of 
hostilities – reaffirm norms already established by the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions and customary international law.70
There is also judicial support in favour of the customary nature of the 
prohibition of superfluous suffering of combatants. In 1946 the Nuremberg International 
Military Tribunal stated with regard to the 1907 Hague Convention IV: “The rules of 
land warfare expressed in the Convention undoubtedly represented an advance over 
existing International Law at the time of their adoption [...] but by 1939 these rules [...] 
were recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded as being declaratory of the 
laws and customs of war”.
 
71
 In the Corfu Channel Case, the ICJ confirmed that 
“elementary considerations of humanity” prohibit the use of certain weapons.72 More 
recent ICJ case law further confirms that some tactics and weapons are prohibited under 
customary humanitarian law.73
Another basic rule of military conflict is the principle of distinction between 
civilian and military objectives, based on the need to protect civilians during the 
  
                                                 
65
 See Article 35 (1) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (8 June 1977): “In any armed 
conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.” 
66
 See DINSTEIN, The Conduct of Hostilities, cit., p. 57-58. 
67
 See Article 23 of 1899 Hague Convention II: “Besides the prohibitions provided by special 
Conventions, it is especially prohibited: […] To employ arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury; […]”. See also Article 35 para. 2 of Additional Protocol I: “It is prohibited to employ 
weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering”. 
68
 On illegal weaponry see GREEN, cit., pp. 125-128 and 133-144; DINSTEIN, loc. ult. cit., pp. 
61-73. 
69
 See DINSTEIN, loc. ult. cit., p. 56. 
70
 See the overview of Protocol I by the International Committee of the Red Cross available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/470?OpenDocument to this effect. 
71
  Reprinted in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 41, 1947, pp. 248-249, quoted by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/195?OpenDocument.  
72
 Corfu Channel Case (Merits), I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4, at p. 22. 
73
 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 
1996, p. 226, at p. 257. 
14 
 
hostilities by limiting the attacks to military targets.74 In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on 
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, the I.C.J. authoritatively found that the principle of 
distinction amounts to an “intrasgressible” norm of international customary law.75 
Article 48 of Additional Protocol I reaffirms this principle: “In order to ensure respect 
for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the 
conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants 
and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives”. The principle of discrimination between 
lawful and unlawful targets has as a logical corollary the prohibition of weapons that are 
not apt to discriminate between the two categories. In Nuclear Weapons in Armed 
Conflict, the I.C.J. stressed that “States must never make civilians the object of attack 
and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between 
civilian and military targets”.76
Against this background, the employment by the U.S. of weapons containing 
depleted uranium
  
77
 amounted to a breach of both the rules on illegal weaponry and the 
principle of discrimination between civilian and military objectives. More specifically, 
Article 23 lett. (a) of the 1907 Hague Convention prohibits the use of poisons,78 and the 
1925 Geneva Protocol establishes the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare;79 moreover, 
Protocol I to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons prohibits the use 
of non-detectible fragments.80 Additionally, the employment of such weapons violates 
the principle of distinction, as depleted uranium particles cannot be contained to the 
battle field, nor disengaged when the war is over, and they cause medical catastrophes 
(cancer, birth defects, and genetic damage) long after the cessation of hostilities.81
Furthermore, such weapons seriously pollute the environment, whereas weapons 
that cause undue harm to the natural environment are prohibited by Article 35 (1) of 
Additional Protocol I,
  
82
                                                 
74
 On the principle of distinction and legitimate military objectives see DINSTEIN, The Conduct 
of Hostilities…, cit., pp. 82-112. 
 and by the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or 
Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, to which the U.S. is 
75
 See Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, loc. cit. 
76
 Ibid. 
77
 See the 2006 report of Consumers for Peace on War Crimes Committed by the United States in 
Iraq and Mechanisms for Accountability (esp. pp. 6 and 20), available at 
http://consumersforpeace.org/pdf/war_crimes_iraq_101006.pdf. 
78
 The provision actually resumes the earlier prohibition, contained in the analogous Article 23 
of the 1899 Hague Convention II, “[t]o employ poison or poisoned arms”. 
79
 The U.S. ratified the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 on April 10, 1975. 
80
 See Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I) to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: “It is prohibited to use any weapon the primary effect of 
which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays”. 
81
 See Consumers for Peace report, cit., p. 20. 
82
 See Article 35 (3) of Additional Protocol I: “It is prohibited to employ methods or means of 
warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to 
the natural environment”. 
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a party.83 Also, there is evidence of growing international concern for the preservation 
of the environment in the event of armed conflict. One example is the inclusion of the 
use of warfare methods causing widespread and severe damage to the environment in 
the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind.84
The U.S. forces also used incendiary weapons (as reluctantly admitted by U.S. 
officials in relation to a 2004 offensive against insurgents in the city of Falluja),
 Moreover, 
former Article 19 para. 3 lett. (d) of the 1996 ILC Draft articles on State Responsibility, 
which drew a distinction between international crimes and international delicts, 
enumerated amongst the examples of crimes “a serious breach of an international 
obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the human 
environment”. For this reason, it may be argued that the prohibition expressed in Article 
35 (1) of Additional Protocol I, while not binding on the U.S. as such, is nevertheless 
binding as an emerging customary rule. 
85
 in 
particular white phosphorus,86 expressly banned by the Protocol on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III) to the 1980 Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons. The United States, while a party to the Convention, has 
not ratified the incendiary weapons protocol; however, in the light of the particularly 
cruel effects of this type of weapons, their prohibition can be said to descend from the 
Hague and Geneva ban on weapons causing unnecessary suffering.87
Another cardinal principle of humanitarian law, directly connected with the 
prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, requires the parties to a conflict to use force 
proportionate to the objective of placing a military target hors de combat, and avoid 
large-scale casualties. Surely, incidental injury to civilians as a result of lawful attacks 
against military objectives is unavoidable in times of war; however, “legitimate 
collateral damage” is not boundless.
 
88
                                                 
83
 The text of the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention was adopted by Resolution 
31/72 of the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1976, and the Convention was opened for signature 
at Geneva on 18 May 1977. The Convention entered into force on October 5, 1978, and was ratified by 
the U.S. on January 17, 1980. 
 As Judge Higgins pointed out in a Dissenting 
Opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case, “even a legitimate target may not be attacked if 
the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the specific military gain 
84
 See Article 20 of the ILC 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind: “Any of the following war crimes constitutes a crime against the peace and security of mankind 
when committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale: […] g) In the case of armed conflict, using 
methods or means of warfare not justified by military necessity with the intent to cause widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment and thereby gravely prejudice the health or survival of 
the population and such damage occurs”. 
85
 See, e.g., BBC News 16 November 2005, US Used White Phosphorus in Iraq at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4440664.stm; see also ‘The Independent’ article The Fog of War: White 
Phosphorus, Fallujah and Some Burning Questions at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/the-fog-of-war-white-phosphorus-fallujah-and-some-
burning-questions-515345.html. 
86
 See Consumers for Peace report, cit., p. 21. 
87
 See The Fog of War, cit.: “White phosphorus is highly flammable and ignites on contact with 
oxygen. If the substance hits someone’s body, it will burn until deprived of oxygen. Globalsecurity.org, a 
defence website, says: ‘Phosphorus burns on the skin are deep and painful... These weapons are 
particularly nasty because white phosphorus continues to burn until it disappears... it could burn right 
down to the bone’.”  
88
 See DINSTEIN, The Conduct of Hostilities, cit., pp. 123-125 on collateral damage. 
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from the attack”.89 Article 51 (5) (b) of Additional Protocol I specifically bans 
“attack[s] which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” 
(emphasis added).90 The classification of excessive attacks as war crimes in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court91
In the light of these considerations, the use of cluster bombs under U.S. 
occupation mostly in urban areas in Iraq, dramatically increasing the number of civilian 
casualties,
 is indicative of the general 
acknowledgement of the importance of proportionality.  
92
 appears inconsistent with international humanitarian law. The use of cluster 
bombs infringes the above-mentioned principles of discrimination, proportionality, and 
legitimate collateral damage, in that “they easily spread from legal to illegal military 
targets (they typically spread over an area of several football fields), and, because they 
have a poor detonation record, continue as unexploded ordinance (UXOs) for many 
years unless cleaned up”.93
Not only the weaponry, but also the military tactics need to be conceived in such 
a way as to observe the principles of distinction and proportionality. Since military 
operations may not result in undue civilian casualties, indiscriminating tactics or means 
of warfare are prohibited. The rules of engagement reportedly directed U.S. soldiers to 
attack insurgents even when they hid into private houses. As the Christian Science 
Monitor notes, “The rules of engagement instruct U.S. soldiers to bring withering force 
to bear on positions they’re attacked from, even when an insurgent ducks into a private 
house for cover”.
  
94
  Other reports also reveal that the military tactics of U.S. forces in 
Iraq were not consistent with the principle of distinction, insofar as they were based on a 
blurred concept of enemy: “[N]umerous reports exist of various abuses against civilians 
arising from tactical decisions: in Haditha in November 2005 where 24 civilians were 
killed, allegedly by U.S. Marines; […] These and numerous other incidences of gross 
abuses of Iraqis are regular occurrences, especially in a military environment that tends 
to judge all Iraqis as the enemy”.95
On the other hand, international norms governing the conduct of combat prohibit 
wanton destruction of property. In particular, the destruction of private or public 
property is prohibited under Article 53 of 1949 Geneva Convention IV, unless rendered 
 
                                                 
89
 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear weapons, cit., p. 587. 
90
 On the meaning of “excessive” see DINSTEIN, loc. ult. cit., pp. 120-121. This principle is 
also related to the rule on precautions. See in particular Article 57 (2) (a) (iii) of Protocol I: “With respect 
to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: those who plan or decide upon an attack shall: […] 
refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”. 
91
 See Article 8 (2) (b) (iv). 
92
 See Consumers for Peace report,  cit. 
93
 Ibid. 
94
 MURPHY, In Tough Iraqi Conflict, Civilians Pay High Price, in Christian Science Monitor, 
January 21, 2004, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0121/p04s01-woiq.html.  
95
 Consumers for Peace report, cit. 
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“absolutely necessary” by military operations.96 Further, Article 147 of Geneva 
Convention IV defines extensive and wanton destruction of property, not justified by 
military necessity, as a grave breach requiring criminal proceedings against the 
perpetrators. The U.S. attacks on Iraqi cities have involved a range of actions causing 
significant damage to cities and land. The findings of the Global Forum Policy in this 
respect are quite alarming: “The Coalition has used overwhelming military force to 
attack several Iraqi cities, on grounds that they were "insurgent strongholds." These 
offensives, using heavy air and land bombardment, culminate in massive armored 
assaults. They have displaced hundreds of thousands of people, caused large civilian 
casualties and destroyed much of the urban areas.”97
One may be tempted to argue that, since insurgents used non-conventional 
tactics of combat, based on the deliberate intermingling with civilians, and the lack of 
distinctive uniforms, the protection provided by humanitarian law to civilians ceases to 
operate. Naturally, the Iraqi belligerents resorting to such tactics were in breach of the 
laws of war, which establish a clear prohibition on the use of human shields
 Several urban areas were thus 
subjected to aggressive sieges that lasted for weeks or months, and resulted in tens of 
thousands of buildings destroyed or severely damaged, as ‘precision’ air attacks cannot 
be realistically carried out on densely built cities.  
98
 and 
“perfidy”,99
                                                 
96
 See Article 53 of 1949 Geneva Convention IV relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War: “Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging 
individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or 
cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary 
by military operations”. 
 but humanitarian law is not based on the principle of reciprocity, and the 
duty of U.S. forces to protect civilian life to the maximum extent possible was not 
displaced by the unlawful conduct of the other party. Significantly, Article 51 (8) of 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions provides that “Any violation of these prohibitions 
[inter alia, the use of civilians to shield military objectives] shall not release the Parties 
to the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and 
civilians, including the obligation to take the precautionary measures provided for in 
Article 57”. An argument pointing to the same conclusion is that civilians used as 
97
 See the report of Global Policy Forum on War and Occupation in Iraq available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/37150.html. The report refers to offensives 
against Falluja in April and November 2004, Najaf (April and August 2004), Tal Afar (September 2004 
and September 2005), Samarra (October 2004, September 2005 and March 2006), al-Qaim (May and 
November 2005), Haditha (October 2005), Ramadi (October 2005 and June-July 2006) and Baqubah 
(January 2007). 
98
 See Article 51 (7) of Additional Protocol I: “The presence or movements of the civilian 
population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military 
operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or 
impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian 
population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield 
military operations”. See also Article 28 of Geneva Convention (IV): “The presence of a protected person 
may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations”. 
99
 See Article 37 (1) (c) of Additional Protocol I: “It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an 
adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he 
is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The following acts are examples of 
perfidy: […] the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status”. 
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human shields remain protected persons under the rules of humanitarian law insofar as 
they do not thereby become combatants, unless they voluntarily support the treacherous 
acts of the belligerents.100
The starvation of civilians as a military tactic is also prohibited. Attacks against 
food sources and water supplies are unlawful, and so is preventing the civilian 
population from being provided with food, water and medical care indispensable to its 
survival. Article 54 (1) of Additional Protocol I reads: “Starvation of civilians as a 
method of warfare is prohibited”. Pursuant to Article 54 (2) of the Protocol, it is 
“prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas […], crops, 
livestock, drinking water installations and supplies […]”. While there is no general 
agreement on its customary value,
 
101
 this provision contains a basic humanitarian 
guarantee; it may be submitted that the prohibition of starvation of civilians cannot be 
overlooked, if the principle of distinction in choosing the methods of warfare is to be 
fully observed. It has also been rightly emphasized that, since inhumane treatment of 
protected persons is prohibited, and indeed constitutes a grave breach of humanitarian 
law, a policy of starvation cannot be deemed lawful.102
The UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Jean Ziegler, cited violations of 
this rule in Tall Afar, Fallujah and other locations, where hunger and deprivation of 
water were used as a weapon of war, in response to the fact that the civilian population 
was being used as a shield by insurgents.
  
103
 Many reports further document and 
condemn the practice of cutting off water, food, and electricity.104
Moreover, buildings dedicated to medical care may not be attacked. According 
to Geneva Convention IV, in particular Articles 18 (1),
 
105
 20 (1),106 21,107 and 23 (1),108
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 They become, in the latter case only, unlawful combatants. See DINSTEIN, The Conduct of 
Hostilities, cit., pp. 130-131. 
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 Ibid., p. 132, and pp. 135-136. 
102
 See GREEN, cit., pp. 143-144. 
103
 See Statement by Jean Ziegler, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, on the Occasion of 
World Food Day, 16 October 2005, on Food and water used as weapons of war in Iraq, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/D53CB85688C438F9C125709D00262AEF?opendocumen
t, para. 14: “Given that insurgents frequently use civilian populations as human shields, the strategy of 
Coalition Forces for military assaults on cities have followed a pattern of firstly encircling the city under 
attack, secondly encouraging the civilian population to flee before the attack by cutting off their food and 
water supplies, in order to isolate insurgents within the encircled city”. See also para. 15: “Earlier reports 
from last year, in September and October 2004, including from the NGO, CASI, also reported that during 
military assaults on Tal Afar, Samarra and Fallujah water supplies were cut off to residents in the cities 
under attack by Coalition Forces, affecting up to 750,000 civilians”. 
104
 See Global Forum Policy, cit., p. 20 ff: “The Coalition has repeatedly denied water to 
residents of cities under siege, including Falluja, Tal Afar and Samarra, affecting up to 750,000 civilians. 
[...] Along with water, the Coalition has cut off electricity (which may power pumps and local wells). 
They also have cut off food and medical supplies, creating a "state of siege" and imposing a humanitarian 
crisis on the entire remaining urban population. [...] The UN reported that in early July 2006, US forces 
imposed a "total blockade" of Rutba "for approximately four days" followed by subsequent blockades 
"intermittently."” 
105
 See Article 18 (1) Geneva Convention IV: “Civilian hospitals organized to give care to the 
wounded and sick, the infirm and maternity cases, may in no circumstances be the object of attack but 
shall at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict”. 
106
 See Article 20 (1) Geneva Convention IV: “Persons regularly and solely engaged in the 
operation and administration of civilian hospitals, including the personnel engaged in the search for, 
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carrying out military operations against medical facilities, personnel or vehicles 
constitutes a serious violation of humanitarian law. The U.S. operations involved attacks 
on hospitals, health care centres and other protected medical facilities and equipment, 
bombing of ambulances, and prevention of humanitarian assistance (in Fallujah, 
Haditha, Al-Qaim, Tall Afar, and Ramadi); this has not only resulted in many 
casualties, but has also had as a consequence the complete breakdown of Iraq’s medical 
infrastructure.109 The UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, in its Resolution 2005/2 on Prohibition of Military Operations Directed Against 
Medical Facilities, Transport and Personnel Entitled to Protection During Armed 
Conflict of 8 August 2005, expressed concern about such practices, and insisted on their 
fundamental incompatibility with the Geneva Conventions.110
Another principle of international humanitarian law provides that the belligerent 
parties must search and care for the wounded, and the dead must be identified as soon as 
possible and treated respectfully. In particular Article 16 of Geneva Convention IV 
requires military forces to search for, and aid, wounded civilians unless prevented by 
military considerations. UN investigators and NGOs have documented breaches of this 
obligation, and apparently in few circumstances can the U.S. abandonment of wounded 
civilians be supported by arguments of military necessity; equally documented is the 
denial of access of impartial humanitarian agencies, such as the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Society, to those in need. Also, the U.S. forces failed to adequately 
collect, identify and document the dead.
 
111
The failure of U.S. forces to comply with the rules of war and humanitarian 
exigencies, by furthering military gain at the expense of human costs, amounts to a 
breach of its international obligations. It also sends the dangerous message that non-
conventional conflicts justify lesser consideration for human life and dignity.  
 
 
 
III. The Failure to Fulfil the Positive Duties of Occupying Powers 
 
In addition to embarking upon actions amounting to prohibited conduct, the U.S. 
arguably failed to fulfil its positive duties as an occupying power in Iraq. As recognized 
                                                                                                                                               
removal and transporting of and caring for wounded and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity cases 
shall be respected and protected”. 
107
 See Article 21 Geneva Convention IV: “Convoys of vehicles or hospital trains on land or 
specially provided vessels on sea, conveying wounded and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity cases, 
shall be respected and protected in the same manner as the hospitals […]”. 
108
 See Article 23 (1) Geneva Convention IV: “Each High Contracting Party shall allow the free 
passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for religious worship 
intended only for civilians of another High Contracting Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall 
likewise permit the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended 
for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases”.  
109
 See Global Policy Forum report, cit., Consumers for Peace report, cit. See also Dahr Jamail’s 
survey Iraqi Hospitals Ailing Under Occupation, available at  
http://www.brusselstribunal.org/pdf/HealthcareUnderOccupationDahrJamail.pdf. 
110
 See E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2005/2. The preamble of the document makes no specific reference to 
Iraq, but more vaguely to “current armed conflicts” (“Alarmed by direct and overt attacks on medical 
facilities, transport and personnel in a number of current armed conflicts”). 
111
 See Consumers for Peace report, cit., pp. 12, 26. 
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in Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003), between the cessation of hostilities on 1 
May 2003 and the transfer of power to the Iraqi Interim Government on 28 June 2004, 
the U.S. had the specific responsibilities and obligations of occupying powers under 
international law, in particular those covered by the provisions of the Hague 
Regulations of 1907 (Articles 42-56) and Geneva Convention IV. 
Occupying powers have an obligation to take all possible measures to restore 
and ensure public order and safety. Article 43 of the Regulations annexed to the 1907 
Hague Convention IV112 provides: “The authority of the legitimate power having in fact 
passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power 
to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, 
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country”.113 This norm thus lays 
down a clear obligation for occupying powers (‘shall’) to protect the life and security of 
people living under their control. This is even more so when belligerent occupation is 
the result of total military defeat accompanied by the dissolution of the State structures, 
hence no administration the occupied State can resume after the cessation of hostilities. 
This duty was acknowledged specifically in connection with the Iraq occupation in the 
2007 judgement of the UK House of Lords in the Al-Jedda case.114 That said, the high 
number of deaths registered during occupation indicates that U.S. forces and their allies 
have failed to adequately protect the lives of Iraqi civilians.115
Another essential duty of an occupying power is to ensure the basic human 
needs of the civilian population, especially access to food, water, and health care. 
Articles 55 (1)
  
116
 and 56 (1)117
                                                 
112
 The Hague Convention IV respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land was adopted on 
October 18, 1907 and entered into force on January 26, 1910.  
 of Geneva Convention IV establish specific positive 
113
 The content of this provision corresponds to customary international law, as recognized by 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the International Court of Justice. For further 
references see SASSÒLI, Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying 
Powers, in EJIL, vol. 16 (4), 2005, pp. 661-694, at pp. 662-663. 
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 See the opinion of Lord Bingham of Cornhill in R (on the application of Al -Jedda) v 
Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58, para. 32: “[D]uring the period when the UK was an 
occupying power (from the cessation of hostilities on 1 May 2003 to the transfer of power to the Iraqi 
Interim Government on 28 June 2004) it was obliged, in the area which it effectively occupied, to take 
necessary measures to protect the safety of the public and its own safety”. See also para. 8: “Major 
combat operations were declared to be complete on 1 May 2003, although hostilities did not end on that 
date in all parts of the country. As from that date the US and the UK became occupying powers, within 
the meaning of Section III of the Hague Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War on land (1907) and 
the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949) in the areas 
which they respectively occupied”. 
115
 While the estimates vary greatly, numerous surveys (Opinion Research Business, The Lancet, 
Iraq Body Count etc.) confirm an astounding number of deaths. See, e.g, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL3048857920080130; http://www.casualty-
monitor.org/2007/12/iraqi-casualty-monitor.html; 
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2806%2969491-9/fulltext; 
http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/reference/press-releases/12/.  
116
 See Article 55 (1) Geneva Convention IV: “To the fullest extent of the means available to it, 
the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, 
in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the 
occupied territory are inadequate”. 
117
 See Article 56 (1) Geneva Convention IV: “To the fullest extent of the means available to it, 
the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local 
authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the 
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obligations in this respect. Nonetheless, the living conditions worsened drastically after 
the invasion: the lack of water, regular electricity supplies, health services and other 
infrastructure services has been widely reported. The failure of the occupation forces to 
establish law and order had as a result the looting and sabotage of oil, gas, and water 
pipelines, and electrical powers stations.118 The precarious security environment 
prevented the Coalition Provisional Authority from reconstructing the country’s 
infrastructure and providing basic services, but also made the operation of relief 
convoys of the World Food Programme virtually impossible.119 The failure to secure 
essential services in the aftermath of the invasion had long-term effects. As emphasized 
in the UN humanitarian appeal for Iraq, “[t]he conflict and its aftermath resulted in the 
widespread breakdown of essential services, severely affecting the population, 
particularly the two thirds of Iraqis living in the urban areas”.120 The failure to repair 
and equip medical centres and to protect medical staff contributed to increased deaths 
among civilians; in 2004 UNICEF reported that due to the collapse of public services, 
the number of children affected by malnutrition had almost doubled (from 4% to 7.7%) 
since the beginning of the war.121
The destruction and plundering of the Iraqi National Museum in Baghdad in 
April 2003 is also attributable to the omissive conduct of the U.S. forces.
  
122
 As Baghdad 
was occupied by American forces in early April 2003, the Pentagon’s Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance sent a memo to senior commanders at the 
Coalition Forces Land Component Command indicating the Baghdad Museum as no. 2 
on a list of 16 priorities to protect, after the Iraqi central bank. It was not until 16 April 
that a military force arrived at the museum, 8 days after museum officials had actively 
requested it.123
                                                                                                                                               
occupied territory, with particular reference to the adoption and application of the prophylactic and 
preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics. Medical 
personnel of all categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties”. 
 As Renfrew suggests, the negligence manifested by the U.S. forces 
amounts to a violation of the obligations of occupying powers in respect of protection of 
118
 See also BBC News 30 June 2009 Iraq Key facts and figures, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7856618.stm, on the standard of living of the population six years after 
invasion, with particular reference to food security, power shortages, and sanitation. 
119
 See WEISS, cit., p. 174. 
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 United Nations, Humanitarian Appeal for Iraq, Revised Inter-agency Appeal 1 April – 31 
December 2003, 1, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/appeals/2003/files/irq03flash2.pdf. 
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 Office of the Iraq oil-for-food programme, fact sheet, available at 
www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/fact-sheet.html. 
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 FOSTER, Missing in Action: the Iraq Museum and the Human Past, in ABRAMS – 
GUNGWU (Eds.), Iraq War and Its Consequences. Thoughts of Nobel Peace Laureates and Eminent 
Scholars, 2003, Singapore (World Scientific Publishing), pp. 295-317, at pp. 304-305, provides a detailed 
description of how the galleries were looted and vandalized: “At dawn on Thursday, April 2003, large 
crowds of people descended upon the Iraq Museum […] and came and went freely until sunset the next 
day, and possibly for much of the next day as well. […] For two days or more, the crowds rushed from 
the museum with boxes, push-carts, bicycles, wheelbarrows, and pockets full of loot. […] Appeals by 
museum staff to the coalition command to protect the museum were unsuccessful. Five days later, the 
museum was still open to anyone who wished to walk around, and an American newspaper reporter who 
walked through the galleries stated that there was nothing left to be seen”. While these events took place 
before the official starting date of non-belligerent occupation, Baghdad was under the effective control of 
U.S. forces at that time. 
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 See RENFREW, Reflections on the Looting of the Iraqi National Museum in Baghdad, in 
ABRAMS – GUNGWU (Eds.), Iraq War..., cit., pp. 319-325, at p. 323.  
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cultural property.124 The gravity of this omissive conduct is compounded by the fact that 
experts had anticipated the risks, and requested military protection for the museum: 
“this was a disaster which was foreseen and which could quite readily have been 
prevented”.125 By contrast, as Foster notes ironically, the site no. 16 for which the 
Pentagon’s Office of Reconstruction had requested protection in its March 26 memo, 
the Iraq oil ministry, was fully protected.126
On the other hand, the occupying powers not only have obligations arising 
strictly under humanitarian international law; they are also bound by obligations 
stemming from international human rights norms. The simultaneous application of the 
two bodies of law was recently confirmed by the I.C.J. in Congo v Uganda: “The Court, 
having concluded that Uganda was an occupying Power in Ituri at the relevant time, 
finds that Uganda’s responsibility is engaged both for any acts of its military that 
violated its international obligations and for any lack of vigilance in preventing 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by other actors present in 
the occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own account”.
  
127
From this perspective, in addition to customary obligations in respect of human 
rights in occupied Iraq, the U.S., who is a party to the 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights as of 8 June 1992,
 It appears 
clear from the wording of the judgement that the occupying power has a positive 
obligation to ensure respect for the fundamental human rights of the inhabitants of the 
occupied territory, including against detrimental action by non-State actors operating in 
the territory. 
128
 also had treaty-based obligations to 
secure the fundamental rights of any individual within its jurisdiction. The extra-
territorial application of the Covenant in respect of foreign territories over which 
Member States exercise jurisdiction in their capacity as occupying powers was 
explicitly acknowledged by the Human Rights Committee. Despite the literal wording 
of Article 2 paragraph 1 of the Covenant,129
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 See ibid., p. 324: “The looting of archaeological sites to provide antiquities for unscrupulous 
collectors and museums is well known […] Indeed to prevent the looting of archaeological sites in the 
open country during or following armed conflict can be no easy task. […] But to allow seven days to 
elapse before the most obvious protective measures were undertaken, measures explicitly formulated in 
general Garner’s memorandum, seems a clear abnegation of the obligations of an occupying power”. 
 the Committee held in its General 
Comment No. 31 of May 2004: “the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to 
citizens of States Parties but must also be available to all individuals […] who may find 
themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party. This principle 
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 FOSTER, cit., p. 304. 
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 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v Uganda), I.C.J. Reports 2005, para. 179. See also para. 180: The Court notes that Uganda at all 
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in breach of its obligations under the rules of international human rights law and international 
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 See Article 2 para. 2 ICCPR: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant […]” (emphasis added). The wording would seem to exclude the disjunctive 
interpretation.  
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also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party 
acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or 
effective control was obtained” (emphasis added).130
Additionally, Article 1 of the Optional Protocol establishing the competence of 
the Human Rights Committee significantly omits the territorial reference: “A State 
Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present Protocol recognizes the 
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals 
subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of 
any of the rights set forth in the Covenant” (emphasis added). It would not seem logical 
to bestow a procedural right under the Protocol upon individuals outside the territory of 
the State unless they enjoy a substantive right under the Covenant itself.
  
131
 Also, it is 
difficult to argue why an instrument establishing a principle of non-discrimination132
It should also be recalled that a similar view was taken by the ICJ in the Israeli 
Wall Advisory Opinion, where it concluded that the provisions of the ICCPR applied 
extraterritorially in the West Bank and Gaza, insofar as Israel exercised effective 
jurisdiction in those territories. The Court found that “the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise 
of its jurisdiction outside its own territory”,
 
should promote different treatment for individuals subject to a State’s authority 
according to whether they find themselves within the territory of the State or on foreign 
territory effectively occupied by that same State. Since the rationale for limiting human 
rights obligations ratione loci is arguably to place the obligations on the State who has 
the actual power to enforce the rights, it seems untenable for States to embrace a 
strikingly different standard of human-rights protection within their borders and in 
occupied territories. 
133
 relying on the object and the purpose of 
the Covenant, on the practice of the Human Rights Committee, as well as on the 
preparatory works.134
The obligation to protect human rights in occupied territories is not affected by 
the existence of a conflict situation. As the I.C.J. stated in the Nicaragua Case, “the 
protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in 
times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain 
provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency”.
  
135
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 See also the Al-Jedda case, cit., where the application of Art. 5 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights to UK actions in occupied Iraq was not disputed, but rather its qualification by a UN 
Security Council resolution under Chapter VII.  
 This position 
was confirmed in Congo v Uganda, where the Court also dealt with the coincident 
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contain an implicit cross-reference to Art. 2 para. 1 of the Covenant, there would have been no need to 
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application of human rights law and humanitarian law.136 It is submitted that, where 
occupation is associated with phenomena of violent insurgency, as in Iraq, the expected 
level of human rights protection should be the one provided for on the national territory 
during states of emergency.137 The U.S. was thus expected to protect those rights of 
Iraqi citizens specifically excluded by the Covenant from any derogation:138
With particular reference to the protection of the right to life in Iraq during 
occupation, it may be argued that it is difficult to establish in all circumstances which 
standard of diligence applied, whether the one dictated by human rights law, or the one 
requested by humanitarian law, as lex specialis.
 the right 
not to be arbitrarily deprived of life, not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, protection from slavery, non-imprisonment for 
debt, non-retroactivity of criminal law, right to legal personality, freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.  
139
 This is because responses to 
organized armed resistance may shift the operational context from law-enforcement 
police action to proper military operations (covered by humanitarian law rather than 
human rights law).140 Only in the latter case is wilful killing permissible, and even so 
excessive civilian casualties are not warranted. In fact, an express provision of 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, corresponding to customary law,141 
places an obligation on the occupying forces to use all necessary precautions to avoid 
the loss of innocent civilian life.142
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25 
 
even in exceptional circumstances such as terrorist emergencies, the use of armed fire 
cannot be deemed lawful except in extreme cases, such as self-defence or last resort in 
order to avoid imminent loss of innocent life.143
It is true that, even under human rights law, the right to life, though non-
derogable under any human rights instrument, is not framed in absolute terms, and can 
be subject to restrictions. Indeed according to the wording of Article 6 of the UN 
Covenant, the prohibition only concerns arbitrary deprivation of life.
 However, since the active hostilities 
were officially considered terminated in May 2003, the prevailing standard for assessing 
U.S. conduct in respect of the right to life of civilians after that date should be that of 
non-belligerent occupation, hence the yardstick of international human rights law. 
144
 However, the 
Human Rights Committee emphasized in its General Comment No. 6 that “[i]t is a right 
which should not be interpreted narrowly”;145 the Committee stresses that “States 
parties should take measures not only to prevent and punish deprivation of life by 
criminal acts, but also to prevent arbitrary killing by their own security forces”, and that 
“the law must strictly control and limit the circumstances in which a person may be 
deprived of his life by such authorities”.146
More specific limitations to the exercise of this right are explicitly present in the 
corresponding article of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, which lists 
as exemptions (i.e. non-arbitrary interference) the defence of third parties from unlawful 
violence, effecting lawful arrest, and lawful containment of an insurrection.
 
147
 The case-
law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning these exceptions may cast a 
light on the scope of the right to life in a situation of emergency threatening the life of 
the nation, which arguably goes beyond the context of the European Convention. 
Significantly, in the case McCann and others v UK of 27 September 1995,148
                                                                                                                                               
precautions shall be taken: […] 3. When a choice is possible between several military objectives for 
obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may 
be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects. […]”. 
 
concerning UK anti-terrorist operations in Gibraltar, the Court specified that the 
compliance of the measures taken by the authorities with the Convention depends on 
their being rigorously proportionate with respect to the defence of third parties from 
143
 This was undoubtedly the case when the challenge faced by the occupying forces was looting 
rather than violent insurgency. 
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 See Article 6 ICCPR: “1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be 
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 2. In countries which have not abolished 
the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with 
the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the 
present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court. […]” 
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unlawful violence,149 and on whether the operation was prepared and supervised in such 
a way as to minimize the use of lethal force.150 The lack of precautions during military 
operations in Chechnya by the Russian authorities was similarly found to be 
incompatible with the European Convention in the Issayeva, Yussupova and Bazayeva 
judgement of 24 February 2005.151
Against this background, reports from international and authoritative NGOs such 
as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International indicate that the U.S. forces did not 
fully comply with their obligations to protect civilian life deriving from either (or both) 
international humanitarian and human rights norms.
 
152
 In particular, a 2003 Human 
Rights Watch report on the civilian casualties caused by U.S. forces in Baghdad during 
the first months after President Bush declared an end to hostilities concludes that “U.S. 
military with responsibility for security in Baghdad is not [...] doing enough to 
minimize harm to civilians as required by international law”, and that the “hostile 
environment for U.S. troops [...] does not absolve the military from its obligations to use 
force in a restrained, proportionate and discriminate manner, and only when strictly 
necessary”.153 The report states that “[t]he individual cases of civilian deaths 
documented in this report reveal a pattern by U.S. forces of over-aggressive tactics, 
indiscriminate shooting in residential areas and a quick reliance on lethal force”.154 
Apparently, the training of U.S. soldiers, who were not prepared for a law-enforcement 
situation as opposed to the usual military context, is partly accountable for the use of 
excessive force against civilians.155
Other human rights violations were largely documented, including 
indiscriminate detention of civilians, often for extended periods and without a charge, 
and abuses to detainees at numerous detention centres, such as Abu Ghraib. The 
requirement to ensure the maintenance of order and safety encompasses respect for the 
judicial safeguards of persons prosecuted for violation of public order, or subject to 
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internment on imperative security grounds, in accordance with Article 78 of Geneva 
Convention IV.156 However, Sassòli argues that “[f]rom materials available today it 
seems that the occupying powers in Iraq created only belatedly a legal basis for 
administrative detention according to Convention IV, although they had recourse to 
widespread detention of civilians without trial from the start of the occupation”.157  It 
should be recalled that, in addition to amounting to a violation of (non-derogable) 
human rights, torture or inhumane treatment, wilfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury, unlawful detention, and the denial of fair trial rights also constitute grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and therefore war crimes.158
 
 
 
IV. U.S. Status in Iraq After 2004: Jus Post Bellum Obligations?  
 
After June 2004, U.S. responsibilities in Iraq in connection with the hardships 
suffered by the civilian population are less clear-cut. For the UN Security Council159 
and the U.S.-led coalition, the occupation ended on 30 June 2004, and the functions of 
government were handed over to a new national government. However, the ongoing 
hostilities against U.S. troops, and the questionable effective authority of the new 
government who accepted the end of the war, raise doubts as to whether the war could 
be deemed truly over in June 2004. Whereas war can be started by unilateral 
declaration, it cannot be necessarily terminated by unilateral declaration; rather, such a 
declaration has a valid effect only if the defeated State undergoes complete debellatio, 
or is willing to abide by the other party’s declaration.160
First of all, it is submitted that the norms governing military occupation remain 
applicable, in accordance with common article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
 How should the continuing 
presence of coalition forces in Iraq be then assessed, and what obligations lie upon 
them?  
161
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long as the U.S. has a military presence in Iraq and objective authority over that 
presence. In fact, the application of the Geneva Conventions is not confined to 
circumstances amounting to military conflict, and covers non-belligerent occupation. 
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This is so regardless of the consent of the local government to the presence of foreign 
troops, for the relevant test is effectiveness of authority. The obligation to secure 
fundamental rights will necessarily fall on the State who has the effective power to do 
so, that is to say the State exercising authority over the territory, regardless of the 
capacity in which it does so. 
However, at least between the end of June 2004162 and 30 January 2005, when 
the first democratic elections took place in Iraq, the fact that the presence of U.S. troops 
occurred ‘at the invitation’ of the Interim Government (though recognized as sovereign 
by UN Security Council Res. 1546) does not modify their legal status, insofar as such 
an invitation does not have any meaningful legal effect. Consent obtained after an 
internationally wrongful act was perpetrated does not exclude the wrongfulness of the 
act; in particular, the consent to the presence of foreign troupes expressed by an entity 
established by the same forces after invasion has little value in legitimizing the foreign 
presence. It can be argued that the U.S. remained an occupying power until February 
2005 to the same extent as before July 2004, even though belligerent occupation could 
be said to be over. The authorization of the continued presence by the Security Council 
in Res. 1546 does not appear to change this fact; not only because the allied military 
forces had not been placed there at the request of the UN,163 but also because even a 
peace-enforcing operation authorized by the UN has the same obligations as an 
occupying power.164
Furthermore, Article 6 (3) of Geneva Convention IV stipulates that “In the case 
of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one year 
after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be 
bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the 
functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of 
the present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143” 
(emphasis added). Thus, the reference point for the termination of obligations under 
international humanitarian law is not the close of military operations, but rather the 
devolution of all functions of government to the local authorities. The maintenance of 
public order, through active police (or even military) operations, including opening fire 
and arresting and detaining suspects, is a paramount governmental function, and it is 
doubtful whether this function was entirely vested on the Iraqi authorities after February 
2005, or indeed at the moment of writing. To put it differently, U.S. forces in Iraq need 
to abide by the law of occupation until the transfer of power to Iraqi authorities has been 
fully completed. The current political and security instability and the hesitations of 
President Obama vis-à-vis the timing of withdrawal leave room for suspecting that Iraqi 
authorities do not possess sufficient effective control yet.  
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The test for whether an armed presence constitutes an ‘occupying power’ has 
been recently considered by the ICJ in Congo v Uganda: “In order to reach a conclusion 
as to whether a State, the military forces of which are present on the territory of another 
State as a result of an intervention, is an “occupying Power” in the meaning of the term 
as understood in the jus in bello, the Court must examine whether there is sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that the said authority was in fact established and exercised by 
the intervening State in the areas in question”.165
Also, if a government is unable to maintain order on its own territory without the 
military involvement of another State, its true exclusive authority may be called into 
question, as acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights in its 1996 
Loizidou ruling. The Court found that the presence of many Turkish troops on the 
territory of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus demonstrated that the latter was not 
the only authority in control of the territory; since Turkey was actually exercising 
control, it had concurrent responsibility for policies and actions adopted on the 
territory.
 The Court refers to forces present “as a 
result of an intervention”, not to hostile forces, and the finding seems applicable to a 
large extent to the U.S. situation in Iraq.  
166
Thus, whether we qualify the post-2004 situation as peace or (international/ 
internal) conflict, the U.S. obligation to enforce ICCPR rights in its capacity as an 
effective authority in the territory subsists. Even if the U.S. is merely acting as an allied 
of the Iraqi government, and assists it in addressing an internal conflict or a turbulent 
domestic situation, the U.S. forces share responsibility for breaches of humanitarian/ 
human rights law in Iraq. 
 The continued presence of U.S. troops, and the reliance of the Iraqi 
government on their action, might be said to suggest that the U.S. shared the 
responsibility for maintenance of security and public order (including human rights) 
long after the official cessation of occupation in 2004. They possibly still do, until their 
withdrawal, or until U.S. troops are placed under the control of Iraqi authorities, and the 
decision as to their final and complete withdrawal lies with the Iraqi authorities 
themselves. 
   
 
V. Concluding Remarks and Concerns for Accountability 
 
The Iraq war was marked by appalling human costs, both during active 
hostilities and non-belligerent occupation, including post-war reconstruction under a 
fragile government, depending upon the former invader’s protection. This was the 
consequence of an invasion which failed to consider the likely impact on the civilian 
population, and of the choice of illegal warfare means and tactics to defeat the Saddam 
regime, maintain the occupation, and put an end to the resistance. The intervention 
hardly had anything humanitarian in the way it was planned and carried out, and 
resulted in a great number of dead and injured civilians, the destruction of homes, cities 
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and infrastructure, a climate of insecurity, and the deprivation of the population of 
assets necessary to satisfy the most basic needs.  
The conduct of U.S. forces raises serious concerns under humanitarian and 
human rights law, arguably engaging the State’s responsibility on the international 
plane. However, any claims before the I.C.J. are prevented by the U.S. withdrawal of 
the declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction after the Nicaragua Case. Any 
condemnation by the Security Council was and remains, naturally, unthinkable. Any 
action before the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed by U.S. personnel is also precluded, since both the U.S. and Iraq 
are third parties in respect of the Rome Statute. If Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo had 
decided in 2006 to investigate the alleged UK abuses in Iraq, the ICC might have found, 
incidentally, that U.S. forces breached humanitarian law;167
 
 however, this was not the 
case. Thus, despite the consistent evidence of violations of international law by the U.S. 
forces, and notwithstanding the numerous reactions of condemnation, especially from 
the transnational civil society, the prospects for invoking and implementing U.S. 
responsibility in connection with the Iraq war remain problematic. These difficulties 
ultimately mirror a far deeper conundrum: how do you hold a hegemon accountable?  
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